CULTURAL CENTRE for FREUDIAN STUDIES and RESEARCH 23 Primrose Gardens, London WW3. Tel: 586 0992

NEVSLETTERS

6 and 7

JULY / AUGUST + SEPTEMBER / OCTOBER 1987

EDITORIAL MESSAGE

We close this year, as we open the next one, with a second newsletter devoted to Child Analysis, some behind-the-scene revelations, a few requests masquerading as demands, and a sustainable degree of confidence for the new year herewith inaugurated.

The centre has received contributions on the leading topic from the following people: D. Leader, D. Machado and F. Nakano. Our grateful thanks to them.

With the CCFSR poised to assume its legal status within the symbolic systems of present day Britain, the editorial committee, until now a random but enthusiastic collection of subscribers, is to be properly formalised as a committee, along with other fields of production within the Centre, notably the Study Groups (or CPs in short), for which the newsletter intends to act as mouthpiece and letterbox.

These new-found powers will include the right, should press(ing) circumstances so require, as they happen to do in this instance, to combine the two issues of a term into a single, larger one.

The names of the committee members, once chosen, will be published in the second issue of this incoming term, and any comments, suggestions and complaints, as well as any contributions, should be addressed to them.

The following should become regular features:

BOOK REVIEWS. - If there are any books you want reviewed, or to review yourself, do not hesitate to contact the Committee, or, until such time, the Centre, allowing at least two weeks before publication of the newsletter is due which is generally the end of the second month.

REPRODUCTION OF AN IVY HOUSE SEMINAR. - Preferences welcome.

CP COMMENTARY. - Each Cartesian Product will have a chance to show aspects of their work or form new groups.

READERSHIP RESPONSE. - ??

Alas, the response of readers this first year has been dismal. While we can endeavour to enhance the quality of both material and presentation, we cannot simulate either dialogue or dialectics. It is up to the readers to articulate somewhat more concretely their own places within that unconscious which the Centre tries to 'open' as often as it can.

Perhaps this is the moment to remind the outgoing year's subscribers that they should resubscribe now, if they want to go on receiving this publication.

A NOTE ON CHILD ANALYSIS

Are children born with an idea of God? Perhaps we don't ask this question too often today, but the nativistic problem is still a central theme in the so-called infant research industry. To the Cartesians and the Cambridge Platonists, Locke replied that the mind of the child is an "empty cabinet", and Newton codified this; "I do not perceive that any idea whatever may be innate". This debate, of course, is an ancient one, and it is a pity that the psychologists today tend to forget its history. We could pose the question, in our context, in a slightly different vocabulary: is the Other there from the start?

ONE OTHER

In a certain sense, the answer is yes. The infant is born into a world of language, a world made up of signifiers that precede its birth and have already given it a place. The parents have already formed ideals and preconceptions as to who and what their child will be and have chosen a proper name. Language precedes the infant's entry into the world. The Other, in the sense of the collection of signifiers is there from the start.

Given the diacritic nature of the signifier and the fact that the infant is born into a constellation which precedes its birth, there must be some principle of order, some injection of reason to pin down the potentially infinite sliding of the signifiers. After all, each signifier simply leads to another signifier. This principle, for Lacan, is supplied by a fundamental signification, a signification which gives sense to the signifying world. For the 'x' of the mother's desire, the paternal metaphor substitutes the phallic signification, allowing the subject to situate itself in the Oedipus. This signification has the function of a limit and provides an anchoring point in relation to the signifiers of the mother's desire, introducing an element of loss, what must be renounced; hence $(-\phi)$ the minus sign indicating a deficit.

If the paternal metaphor allows the subject to install a primary, stabilising signification, it has the double effect of localising jouissance, of coordinating jouissance with the phallus, hence Lacan speaks of phallic jouissance. But this is more precisely a lack of jouissance; the effect of the metaphor is to empty the body of jouissance, the phallus standing for this lack, this evacuation. It signifies a 'manque-à-jouir', a lack which finds its complement in what Lacan called the 'plus-de-jouir', the bit more of jouissance which escapes the anchoring in the phallus. The object, then, recuperates what we lose in becoming subjects. If jouissance is reduced with the operation of the Name-of-the-Father, and the phallus represents this negativisation $(-\phi)$, the object condenses what gets left out of the signifying structure; hence the antinomy of the object and the signifier.

A practical consequence of this basic incompatibility of the object and the signifier concerns interpretation. If the object cannot be named and escapes, in a certain sense, the field of signifiers, then interpretations which aim to 'put everything into words' are misguided from the start. They only offer more material to feed the subject's identification. Lacan's comments start from this supposition, and thus investigate the way in which an interpretation can have an effect on the relation of the subject to the object. This relation is called the phantasy and represents a junction of the signifying system (the subject) and the residue, what is left out of the web of signifiers (the object).

ANOTHER OTHER

If we approach our question from the perspective which Lacan stresses in the 1950's, the symbolic that is there before we are born, the Other, as we said, is there from the start. But as the notion of the symbolic changes, as it sheds its relation to the Other (eg. the passage from schema L to the Borromean knot) the Other is no longer a given. Jacques-Alain Miller has developed this theme, pointing out that the change is correlative to that of a perspective which takes the structure of language as a preliminary of jouissance. The preliminary is not 'la langue' but 'lalangue', and the problematic is the passage from the One of jouissance to the One of the signifier which represents the subject for another signifier. In other words, the Other, the support of communication and the representation of the subject, must be developed. As Lacan says, the Other, as the place where the subject is represented, is NOT there from the start; as an empty set, it requires a unary trait for the emergence of (\$), and, as a function of repetition, a second signifier to make the first one appear. The One of jouissance must be articulated to a signifying One: the second must give a sense to the first. This signifier which makes a cut is the principle of the paternal metaphor, a signifier which in its substitution and the effect of signification it gives, evacuates jouissance.

It is clear that if we work with these terms, we do not need to introduce any mythical idea of the 'child' in the adult, or qualify anxieties and drives as 'infantile'. We are dealing with the relation between a set of terms (the subject, the object, the signifier, etc.) and so it is not necessary to valorise any concept of the 'child'. With a Lacanian framework it is rather a question of studying these relations than those between a child and its parents. As Rosine and Robert Lefort point out, it is this 'unity of structure' which dissolves the manifest separation of adult and child psychoanalysis. Of course, this does not imply that there will be no issues particular to the psychoanalysis of children, but simply that the problems involved share a common framework, that it is a question of working with a set of terms which range equally over the psychoanalysis of adults.

D. LEADER

DE DONATIONE INTER VIVOS

The meaning of the concept 'drive' ranges from 1905, when Freud wrote that a drive (TRIEB) in itself "is without quality", that "what distinguishes the drives from one another and endows them with specific qualities is their relation to their somatic sources and to their aims" and that "the source of an instinct is a process of excitation occurring in an organ and the immediate aim of the instinct lies in the removal of this organic stimulus" (1), to his last works, when it becomes more of an ego theory, which is mainly followed and expanded by the American psychoanalytic school. This concept of the drive as expounded in the earlier work means, according to him, that it can never be known by the subject, unless it be expressed in the psychic structure through a so-called representative.

Returning to Freud, we read that the drive process is felt by the child as a displeasure, a displeasure which could be said to be the result of a tension which occurs when the child is in an organic state of need that has to be satiated. The object presented to the child, whose role is to appease this tension, comes, so to speak, into being, from the child's point of view, with no necessity, on its part, to search for it; but, more important, at this moment, without having any psychical representation. this is what has been denominated as "pure need", since no psychical mediation is felt to be involved in this organic appeasement of the need. The result of this primal experience of satisfaction is the so-called mnemic trace which, according to Freud, subsists permanently, but which is only reactivated once it has been cathected, that is, when a certain amount of psychical energy has been attached to something — an object, an idea, etc. It is this mnemic trace which we could say constitutes for the child the representation of the drive.

As explained by Freud, this mnemic trace is, so to speak, reactivated the moment the drive tension reappears. The process of reactivation or reappearance makes it impossible for the so-called "pure need" to exist any longer as such, since it has been linked to something. This, however, leads the child to take one thing for another since the mnemic trace is, in its understanding, the same thing as its present perception, that is, a misunderstanding, a misapprehension arises between the represented object of a satisfaction far gone and an object which can satisfy its present need. This is what Freud means when he writes that a child, at first, to a certain extent, relies on the so-called "hallucinatory satisfaction" because of its tendency to, through the use of this mnemic system, direct its search towards something which can be equalised to the mnemic characteristics. This all belongs to the realm of need.

Demand, on the other hand, is, first of all, the expression of something which is, so to speak, "beyond", something which can be described as a demand for love. This leads us to the conclusion that the formulation of demand is always structured and addressed to somebody else. The child's aim in this framework is nothing else but being the love object of the Other, who is felt as satisfier of all its needs; in other words, needs which are closely related to its biological requirements and psychological demands.

This demand (for love) transcends, Lacan writes somewhere, all mere objects of satisfaction, for this demand is really only demand for recognition.

The realms of need and demand can, sometimes, be misunderstood. It is said that the child is always right (2). It is the mother, therefore, who misinterprets what the child is trying to communicate. Mme. Dolto, in her fortnightly seminars in Paris, has, frequently dealt with this. She has expressed the view that there is, indeed, a misunderstanding between the demand of the child and the response of the mother, in the sense that she, frequently, reacts to the cries of her child by stuffing it with food, interpreting them as need when, in reality, the child is demanding something which lies beyond need. An interrelating mother can, according to Mme Dolto, soon grasp the differences between expressions of need and those of demand, which are, as she puts it, "demandes de présence". "A child", says she, "that cries because it is hungry or thirsty stops its whining as soon as the mother appears; should it demand the presence of the mother, it continues its prattling even when she is there, for it has things to tell her (3). Should she, at this moment, offer it the feeding bottle, it expresses total despair (4)"; and that " when the infant manifests its desire to communicate interpsychically, it is because the memorised traces of the presence of the mother are no longer sufficient. It becomes necessary for the child to renew her presence in reality in order to reactivate her imaginary presence. The infant recognises its mother and recognises itself through her; having thus recharged its capability to reimagine its mother, the infant will then be able to bear her absence in peace until she returns."(5)

This fort-da process is, for the child, an experience of what has been called "partial fantasies of a being dead in itself" (6), since the separation from the mother can be expereinced as a death. That is why a very long separation from the mother can lead the child, when once again finding itself confronted with the mother's face and voice, try to escape from this presence, this look, this voice, by means of terrified screams, since this presence is now for the child not only the incarnation of death itself but also the bringer of death, to be understood not in its quotidian sense of one's biological death, which Lacan calls "first death", but the "second death", "la mort de l'être même". Toddlers between 18 and 24 months old who tend to try and escape as soon as they see an open door "are searching for the being that they have lost...during a traumatic separation" (7).

The child seems, then, to experience two different occurences. For on the one hand there is something which is supplied without any form of delay, without any psychical mediation. But from the second experience of satisfaction onwards the child finds itself subjected to a demand in order to have its desire expressed. It is the inadequateness of the mediation involved in this which makes the re-experiencing of the first not demanded but later hankered for jouissance impossible with its originator, that is, the (m)Other, which then, as a consequence of this inaccessibility, becomes what Freud named "das Ding", later elaborated by Lacan in his seminar L'ÉTHIQUE DE LA PSYCHANALYSE (1959-60) as an impossible object of desire.

It is from these endless demands that the structure of this desire for an impossible object is formed, which is beyond the object of need. It is this hiatus left behind by "das Ding" which will constitute itself not only as the cause of desire but also as that at which it is aimed. As this hiatus is also the locus which can be occupied by any object, one could say that in reality, the object of desire, in itself, does not exsist, except if it is to express the fact that any object (of desire) is nothing but a substitution for another object, one which is always lacking. This object, the producer of this lack, which can, concomitantly, be the object of desire and the object which causes desire, is called by Lacan objet petit a. it is through this discovery - that is, the existence of a lack in itself - that the child is able to accept the concept of becoming a possible object of desire of the Other for, refusing to accept the existence of this lack in the Other, the child presents itself as this lacked object. The recognition of the lack in the Other - S(Ø) that is, the signifier of the lack in the Other - lack which can never be filled, demonstrates that the child is also able to accept the lack in its own structure of desire. It is only through this recognition that the phallic entrance takes place during the Oedipal dialectic, when the child decides not to be the object of the (m)Other's desire any longer and becomes a desiring subject in its own right, thereby being able to deal with the fact that all subjects are nothing but metonymical objects, substitutions, which are there in lieu of the lost one.

"Man's desire", Lacan wrote, "finds its meaning in the desire of the other, not so much because the other holds the key to the desired object, as because the first object of desire is to be recognised by the other." (8); and somewhere else we can read that "man's desire is the desire of the Other...that is, it is as Other that he desires (which demonstrates the true significance of human passion)" (9). This desire, Lacan states, "is formed in the hiatus where demand and need split", a place which, he continues, reveals the "whim of the Other...whim...which introduces the phantom of Omnipotence, not of the subject, but of the Other, the locus of his demand" (10). It is, however, beyond the realm of demand that the object becomes the object of desire, which only comes into being in its relationship with the Other.

What are the limits of this field we call field of the Other?

This field is nothing more and nothing less than this: the silence.

Not, however, any silence. This silence doesn't mean "not to speak" but is rather the locus of the material through which the subject's message unfolds itself, and, being equivalent to a certain function, that of objet petit a, it forms a link, a knot "between something which is an instant and something which is speaking or not: the Other." (11).

This message takes several forms:

- Psychosis: The subject is here only interested in the message itself, essentially it knows itself to be captivated by the lure of the act of reading it.
- Neurosis : The subject here is interested in the rendez-vous and, naturally, in missing it since, in the end, there is no rendez-vous whatsoever.

- Perversion: Where the subject is only interested in the dimension of desire, since he becomes the desire of the Other, when the subject is caught in desire as desire itself, the victim of, as Lacan puts it, "the pure holocaust" of the desire of the Other as such. (12).

The inclusion of the object of desire into the field of the Other is necessary, according to Lacan, because it marks the signifier as signifier; if this were not to occur, that is, if due to the non-response of the Other, the constitution of this relationship were to collapse, that is, if this mythical object were to be returned to a place away from the Other - as Lacan puts it to nothingness, what one would get is the simulacrum of the destruction of the signifying power. A simulacrum because it can be nothing else, because it cannot be destroyed, since one cannot destroy what one cannot, in the first place, possess. That is why, as exemplified in the Sadean example, the so-called "divine marquis" had, after all the destruction he had scattered throughout his creations, to finally admit to the futility of all these actions and, in his will, in a faint hope of reaching beyond death itself (the "first death"), he aimed to achieve his ultimate goal, the "second death". Thus he writes: "The ditch, once covered over, acorns shall be strewn over it in order that the spot become green again and the copse grown back thick over it, and that the traces of my grave may disappear from the face of the earth" (13).

Simone de Beauvoir, in her long essay on Sade, points out that "there is, no doubt, something vertiginous in the transition from life to death; and the sadist, fascinated by the conflicts between consciousness and flesh, readily pictures himself as the agent of so radical a transformation...but it cannot possibly afford him the supreme satisfaction" (14), and she rightly states that "Sade's sexuality is not a biological matter" (15). Both de Beauvoir and Lacan underline that sadian position; if Lacan can write that there is "the complicity of the Sadian imagination with its object, that is, an external view", she is able to clarify the situation by writing that the "the fantasies in The 120 days of Sodom are narrated before being carried out. By means of this duplication the act becomes a spectacle which one observes from a distance at the same time that one is performing it...it is through these performances that he hopes to reach out to himself; and in order to see himself he must be seen". That is why Jerôme is able to say: "What we are doing here is only the image of what we would like to do". (16)

That which Sade forgets is that repetition, in the Lacanian sense, is always repetition, not of something which we had, something which happened or exsisted in the past, but a repetition of that which was never there, which failed to happen, but which nevertheless retains that which we know as jouissance. It is between this eternal return to the same place, which Lacan calls "sameness" (mêmeté) or, in other words, the real, and the signifying repetition which belongs to the field of the symbolic, that the subject emerges, not any subject, but a subject who is neither the creator nor the character of the enunciation, but a subject resulting from there, a subject called by Lacan Le sujet supposé savoir.

it : as symbolic [ϕ (Phi)] and as image [ϕ (phi)]. "The imaginary function is that which Freud formulated to describe the investment of the object as a narcissistic one ", he writes, and later that "the specular image is the channel which carries the transfusion of libido ("that oral drive through which incorporation takes place" (21)) from the body towards the object" (22) which can express the function of a lack of signifier ($-\phi$). The symbolic phallus, as the signifier of jouissance, as the signifier of the Other's desire can never be negatory ("impossible a négativer") even when "it comes to play the role of a filler" (23). The choice is open.

F. NAKANO.

- (1) S. Freud ON SEXUALITY, Penguin Books, vol. 7, London 1981, p.83
- (2) For further developments on this point see Francoise Dolto's <u>SéMINAIRE DE PSYCHANALYSE D'ENFANTS</u>, Seuil, Paris, 1982 (vol 1) and 1985 (vol 2).
- (3) Somewhere else she describes this as the child's wish to share its fantasies.
- (4) F. Dolto, op. cit, p. 155
- (5) Ibid, p. 156
- (6) Ibid, p. 140
- (7) Ibid, p. 142
- (8) <u>£CRITS</u>, Seuil, Paris 1966, p. 268
- (9) ibid, p. 814
- (10) ibid, p. 814
- (11) Seminar of 17/3/65 (PROBLEMES CRUCIAUX POUR LA PSYCHANALYSE).
- (12) Seminar of 07/4/65 (").
- (13) Simone de Beauvoir <u>MUST VE BURN SADE?</u> in <u>THE 120 DAYS OF SODOM AND OTHER WRITINGS</u>, Grove Press inc. NY, 1966, p. 3
- (14) ibid, p. 29
- (15) ibid, p. 30
- (16) ibid, p. 30-32
- (17) <u>ÉCRITS</u> p. 693.
- (18) ibid, p. 693.
- (19) Seminar of 13/1/65.
- (20) <u>ÉCRITS</u> p. 693.
- (21) Seminar of 3/3/65.
- (22) <u>ÉCRITS</u> p. 822.
- (23) ibid, p. 823.

INSTRUCTION VERSUS EDUCATION: A CONTRIBUTION FROM THE PSYCHOANALYTIC POINT OF VIEW (1).

When we think about the child we immediately face the issue of pedagogy and how it presents itself to us nowadays.

Pedagogy is postulated as a science of education, something that should instruct, in other words, transmit a knowledge. This transmission is effected within the boundaries of an institution, the school in this case, which differentiates itself from other institutions by offering a certain language, one which requires that teachers have mastered their objects of interest.

There is a knowledge that the school knows nothing about. And it is at this point, when we think about the school, that the question arises: to educate or to instruct?

What we often see when looking across the recent pedagogical spectrum is a substitution of education for instruction, the school acting as an "extension of home" as pointed out by Jean Claude Milner in his book "De L' Ecole". The school in this perspective doesn't give a pause to the child, that is, there is no cut between school and family. All of them become educators: the parents, the teachers, the students. The school here takes itself as mirroring a society which is only its own mythical idea. It thus shows itself eager to master a knowledge which does not concern it, a knowledge which the school knows nothing about.

- (1) Note. Although in England the concepts expressed in the title can occasion a huge misunderstanding, I wish nevertheless to articulate their original difference, as used in the romance languages and expressed in the O.E.D., rather than use, say, 'education versus upbringing'.

 The O.E.D. says:
 - INSTRUCTION. 1). The process of teaching.
 - 2). Knowledge or teaching imparted or made known.
 - INSTRUCTIONS.1). Statements making known to a person what he is required to do.
 - TO INSTRUCT. 1). To give (a person) instruction in a subject or skill.
 - 2). To inform.
 - EDUCATION. 1). Systematic training and instruction designed to impart or reveal knowledge and develop skill.
 - TO EDUCATE. 1). To train the minds and abilities of; to provide education.

Perhaps it is not by chance that education is used in the sense of instruction while instruction is hardly used at all. And that is because in England the school is deeply concerned with an education which includes upbringing, the teaching of good manners, how to behave, and other tasks of the family, rather than just to impart knowledge about a given subject.

What an institution may guarantee to each subject is both the right and the ways to reach the desire that animates him. An institution of learning supplies these means through instruction. If on the other handthe school is placed as a mirroring of society and is concerned with theimpossible task of educating, as Freud had already pointed out, it masksits own function. Its task, that of instructing, is embarked upon only never to be accomplished.

To deny knowledge doesn't offer any 'profit'. Yet it is astonishing to notice how frequently, whenever education is discussed, emphasis is laid on so-called professional teaching, that is, the technical one, where the student is directed to only one knowledge, the one which will give him a job. The school should have the role of being an encyclopedia of all knowledge. All knowledge contributes to destroy the power of 'belief' which has always been linked to the various ways of manipulation.

We often witness a major debate concerning pedagogic methods, and what is common to all of them is the fact that these methods no longer seem to be interested in the 'content' as much as the 'form'.

Jean Hebrard in his text "INSTRUCTION OU EDUCATION" says that to learn how to read is to be faced with the lack in the Other - in that sense reading is necessary to attain symbolic mediation. He also says that failure at school occurs when the child becomes aware of the choice 'To play with the letters or to make sense?'.

Contemporary pedagogic methods seem to be trying to obliterate precisely this lack in the Other and the school then starts to have the function of tamponing this 'Real'. It is as if the school supposes it can inscribe the child into a symbolic order anew, forgetting the symbolic order is already there. For instance, "let us pretend that to learn is not so important, to pretend that we are not learning but playing". What is asked of the child is to have a good relation to the material but not always to take advantage of its contents.

We are frequently faced with the failure of a child at school. The school then goes to the family to ask about the possible cause(s) of this failure; and the parents then search until they have identified the likely reason. The child could then be sent to a speech-therapist, a psychopedagogue, or whatever else, in order to have this 'problem' sorted out quickly. The school then looses its autonomy and listens to everyone else. Once again the school masks its true function, that of instruction.

This could be due to a misinterpretation of the freudian texts, particularly the early ones, where education and pedagogy have taken the idea of sexual liberation as the core of their approach as if this were the Freudian discovery. The school, in the name of this liberalism, cannot impose and establish the necesary limits to obtain the natural development of its function - instruction. It does not really constitute a good approach to what psychoanalysis can give us - the discovery of the unconscious. One cannot submit the unconscious to anything, one is, rather, submitted to it, subjected to it. Psychoanalysis points out the desire of a subject and the way the constitution of a subject is bound up with his symptom.

Catherine Millot in "FREUD ANTI-PEDAGOGUE" demonstrates that, in terms of the prevention of neurosis, only the psychoanalytical cure

brings results. When one discovers the unconscious one invalidates the whole pedagogic endeavour in the sense of prevention. That is, pedagogy and psychoanalysis do not complement each other. What is possible is to psychoanalyse the educator and the child, as subjects.

It is in this sense that an evaluation of the pedagogic methods as far as their effects are concerned, is impossible, for the unconscious of both pedagogue and child would come in between.

The knowledge obtained in the analytical process is that of the impossibility of 'jouissance', the impossibility of completeness. This knowledge is radically opposed to the pedagogic process where what appears is the impotence of the teacher in the transmission, and of the child in the assimilation, of learning.

Psychoanalysis brings the possibility of the recognition of unconscious desire. The pedagogue, in the strength of his desire, may create the conditions for the emergence of a style which will give him the competence to perform his function as an instructor.

This desire is formulated as an interrogation concerning the desire of the Other. The analytical cure consists on the one hand of being able to leave the question of desire open. Thus instead of the question — what does my mother desire? — where the phallus comes at once as an answer, it can change to — what does a woman desire? — which remains without an answer: ie., there is a recognition that there is always another answer. On the other hand the cure would be the assumption of the Name-of-the-Father, that is, the assumption of its own symptom.

The analyst cannot, therefore, fulfil the demand of the analysand (who asks - Who am I?). To the pedagogue, educator, or to the family, however, there is a goal to be reached. The demand is clear and will be satisfied (the student asks - What do you teach me? - an answer will be given). If the pedagogue ties his action to a form of instruction, it can become one of the ways of reaching the desire.

Frequently, there is a demand for analysis on the part of parents whose children have a history of failure at school. We cannot know whether the difficulty in school is a symptom or an inhibition. The inhibition would be the eruption of the imaginary in the field of the symbolic. It has to do with the sense. In the inhibition there is no loss of sense, but the subject remains locked within himself, anchored in a dual, specular relationship. There is a reduction of the subject's possibilities in attaining the fulfilment of his desire. It is very common in schools for the teacher to be placed by the children in the position of the "IDEAL ICH", which they will never be able to reach. This is due, most of the time, to certain school patterns in which the teachers place themselves as ideal models with the effect of hindering the acquisition of knowledge. It is a moralistic position which denies the unconscious and its desire.

The symptom would be the emergence of the symbolic into the real. 'Symptom' is the name that the subject gives to the real, his way of approaching it and presenting himself. In the case of the analysand with 'learning difficulties', what should be analysed is the question of his desire, what for him causes the symptom, that is, what his question is. One should not take the demand coming from the parents or even from the school as a symptom of the child, that is, as if the child's ques-

THE PSYCHOANALYST'S ENTERTAINMENT No. III

set by LE CANULAR DÉCHAINÉ.

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DOWN

- First stage reached when middle horn adds note backwards, (4).
- 2. To subdue oneself. (7).
- 5. Stage in which one learns about exchange controls?
 (4).

ACROSS

- 1. I up dose, confusing great riddle-solver. (7).
- 3. Little Hans's interim solution to riddle posed by 1. across (6).
- 4. Thought I read in Latin is an imaginary position one can fall in love with (8).
- 6. Roman iambus scans as a word for madness. (5).

SOLUTION TO PUZZLE No II.

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Sincere apologies for the omission of clue 9. across.

BOOK REVIEWS

Sheila Ernst and Marie Maguire (Eds.).
 Living with the Sphinx: Papers from the Vomen's Therapy Centre.
 London: Vomen's Press, 1987.

The work of the Women's Therapy Centre will be familiar to the many subscribers of this newsletter. The Women's Therapy Centre provides low-cost psychodynamic psychotherapy to female clients in the Greater London area. In many ways, the Women's Therapy Centre might serve as both an inspiration and as a model to other groups and organisations which hope to provide reasonably priced psychotherapeutic services. Recently, Sheila Ernst and Marie Maguire have edited a volume of papers on feminism and psychotherapy written by members of the Centre. Each essay is thoughtful, and I should like to call attention to two especially good contributions, namely, Sheila Ernst's reflections on mothers and daughters, and Vivien Bar's politically astute consideration of the relationship between individual change and social change (a crucial though sadly neglected area of research).

Brett Kahr.

ERRATA

We wish to apologise to D. Machado for an important misprint in her article <u>The Child Abused</u>: In the last sentence, the word "liberty" should read "liberality".

EVENTS

We would like to remind Newsletter readers of the following events:

1. IVY HOUSE SEMINARS (Middlesex Poly, North End road, NW3)

There are three remaining seminars for this term, starting 7 pm.:

25 November 1987

- Marie-Helene Brousse: The mother-child relation

2 December 1987

- Bice Benvenuto: The passion of childhood

9 December 1987

- Darian Leader: Projection and identification

2. BLOOMSBURY SEMINARS (3rd floor, 6 Queen Square, WC1)

- Bernard Burgoyne will continue his seminars on The relation of psychoanalysis to science, mathematics and logic on November 23 and December 7.
- Richard Klein will finish his series of seminars on The Name of the Father on November 30.

All seminars start at 8 pm.

3. SATURDAY SERIES

On Saturday November 21 Jacques-Alain Miller, the Head of the Department of Psychoanalysis at the University of Paris VIII, will hold a seminar from 2 pm. in the ground floor lecture room of the Art Workers Guild. The subject will be: The concept of the Other in Lacan. There will be an entry fee of £3, including tea.

INTRODUCTORY SENIMARS

ON THE PSYCHOANALYTICAL WORK OF

JACQUES LACAN

To be held in the Club room of the October Gallery, 24 Old Gloucester Street, London WC1, every Monday from 8 pm. to 10.30 pm., including a tea-break, and beginning on Monday, 11 January 1988.

The seminars are given by the founder members of the ${\tt CULTURAL}$ CENTRE FOR FREUDIAN STUDIES AND RESEARCH.

		PROGRAM:	
JANUARY	11 -	The Functioning of the Image: Lacan 1932 to 1948.	B. Burgoyne
	18 -	Structuralism and the Dominance of the Symbolic.	R. Klein
	25 -	The Introduction of the Capital Other.	R. Klein
FEBRUARY	1 -	Lacan's view on Psychosis: 1932 to 1958.	B. Benvenuto
	8 -	The Structuring of Desire: Lacan 1950 to 1960.	B. Burgoyne
	15 -	The Father and the Real.	R. Klein
	22 -	Symbolic, Imaginary and Real.	D. Leader
	29 -	Transference and Desire in the Direction of the Treatment.	B. Benvenuto
MARCH	7 -	Lacan's Seminar XI.	D. Leader
	14 -	The Woman's Sexuality and Sexual Difference.	B. Benvenuto
	21 -	What Language is Psychoanalysis written in?	B. Burgoyne
	28 -	Interpretation.	D. Leader
The semin	nars wi alysis	ll include comparisons and contrasts with Anglo-Sa and a discussion time of one hour will follow on ea	xon ach one.
The fee f		series of twelve seminars is £60-00.	
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- 5. CHILD ANALYSIS WORKING GROUP (14 Eton Hall, Eton college road, NW3)
- There are two meetings left for this term, starting 8.30 pm:
- 19 November 1987
- Danuza Machado: Latency.
- 10 December 1987
 - Video and discussion on L'enfant sauvage by Francois Truffaut.

Subscribers will receive both the program and the reading list for the second term.

In this second term, the CAWG aims to explore the various approaches to children in different areas of work, such as school, social work, child psychiatry, family therapy, child abuse, and hopes to elicit the contribution of people working in these fields. This work will itself form part of a larger project which aims to lay the foundations for a Child Analysis Clinic, or at least to elicit a greater interest in such a possibility. Students, adult and child psychotherapists from various formations are welcome.

Analysis Clinic, or at least to elicit a greater interest in such a possibility. Students, adult and child psychotherapists from various formations are welcome.
The subscription rate for one term is £10 (£5 for subscribers to the CCFSR).
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